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1Preserving the Old Beijing: 
Th e First Confl ict between Chinese 
Architects and the Communist 
Government in the 1950s
Xiao Hu
College of Architecture
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Abstract
After the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China in 1949, Chi-
nese modern architecture underwent a signifi cant change both in practice and ed-
ucation. Before 1949, Chinese modern architecture had been well-characterized 
as a Western construct. Most architects and architectural educators haad obtained 
their degrees from the US, France, Britain and Japan. A small group of outstand-
ing architects was considered the backbone of Chinese architecture--men such as 
Liang Sicheng, Chen Zhi, and Yang Tingbao, who graduated from the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania, where Philip Crete applied his Beaux-Arts concepts in archi-
tectural teaching. When they returned to China, these architects tried to combine 
the Beaux-Arts design principles with the traditional Chinese language of archi-
tecture. Some of them, like Liang Sicheng and Liu Dunzhen, engaged in research 
on traditional architecture and the preservation of traditional buildings and struc-
tures. Th eir contributions established the framework of Chinese architectural his-
tory and promoted the concept that old buildings were symbols of a previous civi-
lization that needed to be preserved. 
After the Communist Party took control of Beijing in January 1949, these 
architects’ eff orts encountered great challenges from the new government. Th e 
Communist Party considered old buildings to be icons of a previous corrupt so-
ciety, and the old houses were the physical indicators of a ruling classes’ ideolog-
ical demands and will. Additionally, the Communist government also wanted to 
establish new spatial icons for their new era. Destroying old houses and build-
ing new cities was a critical priority for the Communist leaders. Th erefore, a con-
siderable confl ict emerged between the professional architects and the Commu-
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 nist leaders during the early 1950s. From 1952, the Communist Party planned to 
transform Beijing, the ancient Chinese cultural and political center, into an indus-
trial and bureaucratic city with an extended immigrant population. According to 
this plan, thousands of old houses, gateway structures, and traditional streets were 
to be demolished. Worst of all, what was considered the best remaining old city-
wall in the world, the Beijing city-wall was scheduled to be removed. Some out-
standing architects strongly objected to this plan. Liang and other scholars even 
provided alternative design solutions for preserving these old buildings while pro-
moting economic development.
Th is paper explores the architectural confl ict between Chinese architects and 
the Communist Party on the issue of preserving old Beijing in early 1950s. One 
of its primary goals is to investigate the factors that produced this confl ict and the 
solutions proposed on each side to resolve it. Another primary goal is to examine 
the basic characteristics of Chinese policy-making process through the example of 
this confl ict. Th is paper provides a historical lesson for current Chinese architects, 
who are facing similar problems now when dealing with local government offi  cials 
on issues of historical preservation.
orn
1. Introduction
For a long time, how to develop Beijing into a modern metropo-
lis while to preserve well its historic splendor is a long-standing di-
lemma for Chinese architects and offi  cials. Fifty years ago, Beijing 
was the world’s sole well-preserved medieval city. It consisted of four 
layers of urban fabric: the Forbidden City at the center, the Imperi-
al City surrounding it, and the inner city and outer city outside of the 
Imperial City, both referring to residential areas for common peo-
ple along with temples and markets. Th is layout was an unparalleled 
masterpiece of a legacy of the Ming and Qing dynasties, refl ecting 
Chinese ancient philosophies and achievements. Wu Liangyong, an 
prominent Chinese architecture and urban planning professor, con-
sidered Beijing an excellent example of Chinese traditional city plan-
ning, which “had highly integrated individual building designs, land-
scape designs and visual design”(Bao, 2004). After more than 50 years 
of renewed construction, great changes have taken place in Beijing, 
which has become one of the smoggiest and the most congested cit-
ies in the world. A city of “lingering splendor” was how British writ-
er John Blofeld saw Beijing in the late 1930s. Arriving in 1934, he 
was one of the last Westerners to record the city’s breathtaking great-
ness before the communists pulled down its castellated walls (Bezlo-
va, 2000). Clear blue skies crowned the imperial grandeur then. To-
day, Beijing is shrouded in such thick smog of soot and fumes that 
the sky is no longer blue. In 2005, in order to prepare for 2008’s Bei-
jing Olympic Game, the Chinese Communist Party has launched a 
massive clear-up campaign designed to turn Beijing from a chock-
ing industrial wasteland into an international metropolis of con-
sumption and culture. Th is proposal planed to move more than 700 
state-owned companies of heavy industry out of Beijing and to re-
store Beijing city walls and other signifi cant old buildings. Th e Com-
munist Party tries to restore the previous glory of Beijing by bringing 
Beijing closer to what it was before the communists took over Chi-
na — a city dedicated to cultural delights, full of quaint shops, the-
aters, tea houses and lush gardens. After 55 years of mismanagement, 
now the Communist Party has fi nally recognized that what disas-
trous consequences its decision had produced for this city. 
Having served for 850 years as the national capital, Beijing had 
the best-preserved imperial city in the world, with a huge palace 
complex still intact, the residential area which includes courtyards 
and hutongs, as well as the enclosed city-walls and their watch 
towers. It took Chinese emperors centuries to build their fabu-
lous capital, but only a decade for the Party to obliterate its ex-
cellence. By 1965, before the Cultural Revolution was launched, 
nearly all city-walls, 95% of pailous — the column-beam framed 
structures used as gateways — and 90% of watch towers had been 
demolished and eradicated for the seek of accommodating admin-
istrative development (Wang, 2003, p12). Despite the huge re-
sources and massive eff orts the government is using to restore the 
history of Beijing today, there is no remedy for the damage. In or-
der to preserve the old city of Beijing, a group of celebrated Chi-
nese architects had sacrifi ced their reputation, liberty, comfortable 
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life, family and future. Th e confl ict of how to preserve and develop 
the city of Beijing between them and the Communist Party fi fty 
years ago refl ected the two diff erent understanding and approach-
es in the ideological structure between Chinese top intellectuals 
and the party leaders. To some degree, this confl ict had intensifi ed 
Mao’s immanent suspicion of intellectuals and the fates of archi-
tects who objected the government’s proposal had indicated the 
oppressed fate of the majority of Chinese intellectuals later in the 
“Hundred Flower” campaign and Cultural Revolution. 
2. Liang Sicheng and Chen Zhanxiang: 
Chinese Essence and Western Application
Son of an outstanding Chinese scholar and reformer Liang 
Qichao, Liang Sicheng was born in Japan when his father was go-
ing into exile at Japan. He had studied with Paul Cret at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania with a group of Chinese colleagues like 
Yang Tingbao and Chen Zhi. After graduated in 1927, Liang 
spent a brief period of time in the U.S. working for Cret with his 
wife, Lin Huiying (Phyllis Lin), also a Penn graduate in fi ne arts 
(Lin Zhu, 1996, p.238-242). In 1928, Liang and Lin returned to 
China and established the architecture program at the Northeast 
University (Dongbei Daxue) at Shenyang, one of the fi rst archi-
tectural education programs in China. In 1931, he had to termi-
nate the program due to the Japanese invasion. He and his wife 
took up posts at the Society for Research in Chinese Architec-
ture (Zhongguo Yinzao Xuehui) established in 1930 by Zhu Qiq-
ian. While teaching in several universities, Liang and Lin, joined 
by Liu Dunzheng, an architecture graduate from Tokyo Institute 
of Technology in 1920, had consistently kept the interest to track 
the developments of Chinese traditional architecture. During the 
1930s-1940s, Liang directed a research team to travel more than 
200 counties in northern China. Th is small research team consist-
ing of 15- 20 participants had discovered some of the oldest timber 
structures in China. Th ey measured, surveyed and analyzed more 
than 2,000 traditional Chinese buildings (Deng, 2005).   
Comparing with Laing Sicheng, few Chinese people remembered 
Chen Zhanxiang (Charlie Chen), an architecture graduate from 
University of Liverpool, U.K. with a master degree in Urban Plan-
ning. After returning to China in 1946, Chen had joined the Na-
tional Central University (Zhongyang Daxue) as an urban planning 
professor and the director of Urban Planning Division in the Shang-
hai Planning Committee in 1948 (Wang, 2003). Right after Shang-
hai was taken over by the communist army in 1949, Chen was invit-
ed to Beijing to work with Liang Sicheng.
Both Liang Sicheng and Chen Zhanxiang were born into the 
paradoxical China of the early century, when traditionalism crossed 
and co-existed with modernity. Th ey came from families that great-
ly value traditions and strongly took pride of the culture. Filial de-
votion of son to father was still primary virtue expected of any Chi-
nese boy then. Liang’s father, Liang Qichao earned his fame as when 
he became a leader of the reform movement of 1898, when Japan’s 
unexpected defeat of China in 1895 and the imperial powers’ sei-
zure of spheres of interest in early 1898 seemed to threaten the ac-
tual dismemberment of the Chinese state (Fairbank, 1994, p3). In 
the summer of 1898, Liang Qichao participated to organize a sud-
den attempt to adopt western political system as application while 
remaining Confucianism as the essence of Chinese society. Follow-
ing his teacher Kang Youwei, Laing Qichao considered that Confu-
cianism was not just a self-admitted transmitter of ancient knowl-
edge but an innovator that used the cloak of antiquity to advance 
more radical ideas about life and moral experience. Liang Qichao 
was forced to exile by the Qing court when the conservatives put 
down the reform. Liang Qichao and other leaders of the failed re-
form demonstrated more a desire for power sharing and, more im-
portantly, the emergence of a new generation of Chinese intellec-
tuals who were willing to accept the know-how western knowledge 
and systems while still enjoying the entrenched tradition of Con-
fucianism. Being a son of this new generation of Chinese intellec-
tuals, Liang Sicheng was sent to a westernized preparatory school 
and a westernized college, while being rigorously tutored Chinese 
classic philosophies by his father (Fairbank, 1996, p.2). Trying to 
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balance the western knowledge learned from school, Liang Qichao 
made use of semester breaks and holidays to teach his sons classic 
philosophies and culture. He started from “the Origins of the Clas-
sic Philosophies (Guoxue Yuanyuan)”, then “Mencius” and Mo-
hism (Lin zhu, 2004, p.24). According to Liang Sicheng, his fa-
ther always showed apparent attitudes towards diff erent cultural, 
philosophical and political issues and had been so strongly confi -
dent about his judgment that there should be no any argument (Lin 
zhu, 2004, p.33).Th e infused strong cultural pride and the waning 
condition of China’s situation had provoked a powerful national-
ism in Liang Sicheng’s heart. When back to China and studying at 
the Qinghua School, he gradually involved in political debate and 
became “an outstanding artist with matured political attitude” (Lin 
zhu, 2004, p.24). In the May Fourth Movement in 1919, Liang had 
been the leader of the “Ten Bonds of Patriots” and was active in or-
ganizing student demonstrations (Lin zhu, 2004, p.24). A sudden 
car accident in 1923 on Liang Sicheng’s way to attend a “Nation-
al Disgrace” event had postponed his college life in the U.S. for one 
year. Even though Sicheng felt so disappointed, his father, Liang 
Qichao considered it a good opportunity to reinforce his son’s clas-
sic Chinese background. In a letter to Sicheng, Liang Qichao wrote 
“I want you to read ‘the Analects’ (Lun Yu) and ‘Mancius’ (Meng 
Zi) during the two months in hospital. Reading harder, trying to re-
cite and cite some parts of the texts will be considerably useful to 
cultivate your morality, develop your intelligence and improve your 
writing style. If you have more time, I strongly suggest you to read 
‘Xun Zi’.” (Lin zhu, 2004, p.48). Even Sicheng had started his col-
lege life in the U.S., Liang Qichao still intervened his son’s study 
by sending his advices via letter. For example, when Sicheng com-
plained the overloaded study on learning classic Greek and Roman 
architectural forms, Liang Qichao wrote “I am so glad to hear that 
you have this feeling, which indicates the progress you had made in 
your study. Mencius said that skills only off ered you propriety and 
rule, not creativity. What you learned from school is to learn pro-
priety and rules, which are just tools of seeking creativity. A creative 
person will become more creative once he has mastered propriety 
and rules (Lin zhu, 2004, p.50). 
Chen Zhanxiang was born in a tailor family in Shanghai at 1916 
(Wikipedia, 2001). While studying in a Chinese school, Chen also 
was tutored English by a Portuguese teacher hired by his father 
(Chen & Chen, 2002). He went to the Architecture School of Liver-
pool University in 1938 (Chen, 1980), when China was struggling to 
resist Japanese invasion. During his college life in Britain, Chen had 
actively participated in public presentation, in which he introduced 
China’s resistance and struggle against Japanese invasion. Supported 
by the British Council Scholarship and advised by Sir Patrick Aber-
crombie, Chen joined the doctor program in London University in 
1944 (Wikipedia, 2001). In 1946, Chen accepted the invitation from 
the Nationalist (KMT) government to direct Beijing planning proj-
ects and terminated his doctor study in Britain. After back to China, 
he stayed at Nanjing and Shanghai for three years as the civil war in 
northern China prevented him from working in Beijing.     
Involving themselves in education, professional practice and re-
search, both Chen and Liang paid little attention on the massive po-
litical crisis in China after the World War II. As the many other Chi-
nese intellectuals, Liang and Chen did not have the slightest interest 
in politics. However, seeing the tremendous corruption, chaos of eco-
nomic and social system, and continuous confl icts between the KMT 
government and common people, many Chinese intellectuals had de-
serted the KMT government and hoped a new replacement. Th e 
strong passion of traditional culture and the worry of the state’s fu-
ture had drove them to unconsciously favor the communist’s politi-
cal attitude, which advocated removing all foreign priorities and feu-
dalistic restraints in China and establishing a democrat and socialistic 
new China. Without any direct contact, Liang and Chen just consid-
ered the communists a new strength of replacement as if a new dynas-
ty took over the old one, repeatedly occurred in Chinese history. Two 
trivial direct encounters between the communist army and these two 
architects totally changed their perception of the communists and, lat-
er, their life. 
Before taking over the city of Beijing, Mao’s army had occupied 
Qinghua campus on the edge of urban area. One night, a PLA of-
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fi cer came to visit Liang and his wife Lin and ask to mark all areas 
of cultural value, so that they would be preserved if the fi ghting ex-
tended to the city. Liang was surprised impressed and then remem-
bered that he had sent Zhou En-lai, the primary minister of the 
People’s Republic later, in Chongqing a few copies of his analogous 
lists for wartime preservation (Fairbank, 1996, p.169). Liang had 
sent many reports to the Nationalist (KMT) government once fi nd-
ing a new traditional building, but usually no response made (Lin 
Zhu, 2004, p.50). Now the communists willingly referred to him for 
preserving the old buildings. Liang suddenly felt the strong emo-
tional bond between him and the communists and kept telling ev-
eryone that the communist party was a “wonderful” party (Lin Zhu, 
2004, p.57). 
Chen was preparing to leave for Taiwan when the communists 
took over Shanghai. He witnessed that the PLA soldiers was sleep-
ing on the street in rain without disturbing any citizens. He asked 
his wife to bring some soups to these soldiers but being declined 
with thanks. Chen was so moved and impressed that he torn the 
air tickets to Taiwan into pieces and said “a party can educate her 
soldiers so well like this, why I still suspect her to establish a won-
derful new China?” (Wang, 2003, p78). 
In addition, both Liang and Chen had favored the socialistic 
planning before the communists’ victory in 1949. Th ey believed that 
the nationalized land and unchallengeable state authority made it 
possible that all city plans were well controlled by the government. 
Chen remembered that “even though we had little idea about the 
socialistic system, we were longing for it and considered the Sovi-
et Union the heaven of city planning professionals.” (Wang, 2003, 
p91). Liang thought that any urban planning eff ort was restricted 
by the private land system (Lin zhu, 2004, p.75). By 1950, the new 
government carted away 33,000 tons of garbage and 61,000 tons 
of stinking scum and excrement littering the street and byways of 
Beijing since the Ming Dynasty (Lin zhu, 2004, p.74). Liang rec-
ognized that only under the socialistic system could people be or-
ganized and work together effi  ciently to complete a city-wide con-
struction (Chen, 1980). 
3. Th e Confl ict between Preservation and Development
After WWI, many social and structural problems had emerged 
in the major European cities. Th e radical increased rural-to-ur-
ban population exacerbated the shortage of urban residence and 
brought the urban slums. With the expansion of city scale, many 
new residences were built beside industrial factories, making envi-
ronment more polluted. Coming with the change are traffi  c jams, 
soared living expense, high unemployment and crime rate, and in-
effi  cient civic service. Th e WWII reinforced the urban crisis with 
more workers needed in urban heavy industry and city authority 
highly centralized. To solve these social and functional problems, 
the British government completed a London planning proposal be-
fore the end of the WWII. Sir Patrick Abercrombie, the adviser of 
Chen Zhanxiang, took in charge of the London planning. In this 
proposal, a few satellite towns would be built outside of the edge of 
London. Unlike average small towns in countryside, these satellite 
towns possessed all civic services that a major city had and fulfi lled 
the similar functions that a major city performed. Th e only diff er-
ence was the scale. Th is proposal was designed to reduce the urban 
social and functional pressures by transferring parts of urban func-
tions to these satellite towns. It overcame the negative outcomes 
of the Garden City planning, in which the satellite towns around 
London were only considered the dormitory cities. 
Th e London Planning provided an instruction to Chinese architects. 
Chen Zhanxiang recalled that “We learned that a city could not be con-
sidered a container, in which we could place anything. Otherwise, this 
city would die. Th e 1944 London project taught us that some urban 
functions had to move out and seek for new places for accommodation. 
To reduce the urban population, planners developed more than ten sat-
ellite towns around London. As a result, the urban population in the old 
London area had reduced from 12 million to 7 million.” (Wang, 2002).  
Invited by Liang Sicheng, Chen Zhanxiang moved to Beijing in 
May 1949, becoming the director of Planning Offi  ce, Beijing Ur-
ban Planning Commission. In the same time, the Communist Par-
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ty planned to establish a new government and locate the capital city 
at Beijing. Before Chen’s joining, Liang had already a preliminary 
plan to develop a new urban center to the west of the old Beijing 
city, where during the WWII, the Japanese authority had developed 
a small scale residential plan. Chen recalled that “Liang Sicheng’s 
objective was to preserve the old city of Beijing. I strongly agree on 
this. However, I thought Liang put the new urban center too far 
away from the old city, which would hurt the development of old 
city and bring in bad communication.” (Chen, 1980). 
In December, 1949, Liang and Chen attended the Beijing City 
Planning Conference at the city hall building. A group of Soviet ar-
chitects and planners joined this conference and brought their propos-
al for developing the new capital of the communist China. Th is pro-
posal, named “Th e Plan of Beijing’s Future Development”, suggested 
that “Beijing should be built not only the center of culture, art and pol-
itics, but also the center of industry. Th ere is little industry existing in 
Beijing now and the percentage of workers is only 4% of the total Bei-
jing population. In Moscow, the worker class has occupied more than 
25% of the total population. Th erefore, Beijing is not a city of work-
er class by far. Most urban population is not workers, but business-
men and exploiters. Th e city of Beijing should be re-organized.” (Th e 
Editing Committee of the History of Beijing Construction, 1995). 
As to the issue of city planning, this proposal considered construct-
ing the central square the most important issue when developing Bei-
jing. Like the Red Square in Moscow, once the new central square was 
determined, all urban major streets would be determined (Th e Edit-
ing Committee of the History of Beijing Construction, 1995). Soviet 
planners suggested that the new central city square should be built at 
the Tian Anmen area, where the entrance of old imperial city located 
and the inauguration of the new government was hold. 
Without knowing Liang and Chen’s idea, the Soviet propos-
al criticized the idea of building new urban centers outside of old 
Beijing because “it is not economic, but an eff ort to give up the old 
town.” (Th e Editing Committee of the History of Beijing Con-
struction, 1995). Having the central city square in the old city, So-
viet planners considered it necessary to build new political and civic 
centers in the old city, and then the staff s housing near the politi-
cal centers. According to this proposal, the most economic way to 
develop Beijing was to replace old city with new city. A new town 
needed new civic service facilities, which could be 40-50% of the 
total cost of building a new town; however, with the existing facil-
ities in the old city, that expense could be saved if developing the 
new center in the old city (Th e Editing Committee of the History 
of Beijing Construction, 1995). In addition, the materials from the 
demolished old houses could be re-used during rebuilding. 
Th e Soviet proposal was defi nitely beyond Liang and Chen’s ex-
pectation. Th ese Soviet experts in fact denied the historical value 
of old Beijing and mechanically replicated the experience of build-
ing Moscow without considering the specifi c condition of Beijing. 
Th e fi rst dissension happened. Chen recalled that “It was the fi rst 
time for me to attend this kind of conference. I was too naïve then 
and did not know any outcome if I expressed my disagreement. I 
just thought these Soviet experts were friends and just came here 
to discuss the future of Beijing. So I stood up right after the So-
viet planner fi nished his speech. I thought the Soviet proposal was 
to intensify the old city’s burden, which had been overweighed. I 
asked these Soviet experts how they thought the relationship be-
tween the urban and the rural. One of them answered that the re-
lationship was too complex to answer now and needed to be solved 
by socialistic development.” (Chen, 1991). 
In this discuss, an important message was released from a So-
viet planner. “Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing had told us that he 
had discussed how to develop Beijing with Chairman Mao. Accord 
to him, Chairman Mao agreed that the major government agen-
cies must stay in the city and the secondary offi  ces may move out 
to the new towns.” (Th e Editing Committee of the History of Bei-
jing Construction, 1995). In addition, the Soviet planner political-
ized this discussion — “when constructing Moscow, we also have 
this kind of suggestion like yours to preserve the old Moscow and 
build a new one besides it. Comrade Stalin pointed out it was pet-
ty bourgeois’ unpractical fantasy. Developing an old object to a new 
phrase and fi nally changing its nature is a practice of Marxism. 
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Th erefore, we rejected it and rebuilt Moscow with socialistic devel-
opment.” (Th e Editing Committee of the History of Beijing Con-
struction, 1995).
Liang and Chen consequently became the minority during this 
conference. On Dec., 19, 1949, Cao Yanxin, the director of Bei-
jing Ministry of Construction along with the vice director, Zhao 
Pengfei, formulated the fi nal document of this conference “Th e 
Suggestions for Developing Beijing” (Guanyu Beijing Shi Jiang-
lai Fazhan de Yijian), in which they expressed this document to-
tally agree on the Soviet experts’ proposal. (Cao yanxin and Zhao 
Pengfei, 1995). It concluded that “regarding the limit of time and 
resources, building new town outside of the existing city scale 
would generate the indiff erence of old city and the imbalance of 
development and preservation. It is impracticable even though it 
came from good wish.” (Cao yanxin and Zhao Pengfei, 1995). Li-
ang and Chen’s idea was not considered a political mistake and 
still were deemed as the patriotic intellectuals. 
But Liang and Chen did not give up their eff orts. Th ey thought it 
was considerably necessary to develop a detailed proposal for clearer 
expressing their idea. Liang took charge of research while Chen pri-
marily worked on planning (Wang, 2002). In February 1950, the Li-
ang and Chen fi nished their proposal and named it “Th e suggestion 
of the location for the Central government political center” (Guanyu 
Zhongyang Zhengfu Zhongyang Xinzheng Qu Weizhi de Jianyi). 
Liang Sicheng spent his personal expense to publish this propos-
al into pamphlet and sent it directly to the primary minister Zhou 
En-lai (Ye, 2004). Th is proposal with 25,000 characters consisted of 
three sections  1) the reasons of locating the political center as soon 
as possible, 2) the reasons of building a new center to the west of old 
Beijing, and 3) Developing the western new urban center would be 
more economic than replacing the old city (Wang, 2002). In the fi rst 
section, Liang and Chen posited that the potential political cen-
ter would be larger than the imperial city and its size determined 
the primary importance of selecting a good location to accommo-
date this center. Th ey clearly pointed that Beijing was the capital 
city of China during the recent 800 years. Many old buildings had 
become the symbols of Chinese civilization. Th e integrated connec-
tion of these buildings and their hierarchical orders were exactly the 
feature of the old city of Beijing. If the old city was replaced by de-
molishing old building while building new ones, the entire Beijing 
would be dead. In the section of “the reasons of building a new cen-
ter to the west of old Beijing”, Liang and Chen criticized the Soviet 
proposal by claiming that the Soviet proposal had repeated the same 
mistake by simply laying buildings along streets and avenues, which 
would amplify urban population and generate huge traffi  c jams. In 
the last section, Liang and Chen concluded fi ve major disadvantag-
es of developing a new city in the old city —— 1) it would intensify 
the existing urban pressure of overweighed population; 2) if the old 
city were replaced by the new buildings, the existing needs would re-
quire to demolish at least 130,000 houses and to move out 182,000 
residents, which was also a large fi nancial burden; 3) If many high-
rise buildings were built in the old city, it would destroy the en-
tire physical face of old Beijing; 4) Increasing buildings along ma-
jor streets and roads would worsen the existing traffi  c condition and 
increase the possibility of traffi  c jams and car accidents; and 5) new 
and old buildings being placed together would generate consider-
able functional confl icts (Wang, 2002). At the fi nal pages, Liang and 
Chen expressed that where the new urban center was built should 
be carefully pondered over; otherwise the mistakes would be huge 
and could not be compensated. Two months had passed, Liang and 
Zhou did not receive any feedback from Zhou En-lai. Th erefore, Li-
ang wrote a letter to Zhou, in which he solicited Zhou to read the 
proposal and off er a meeting (Liang, 1986). 
Th e political leaders’ responses never came to Liang and Chen, but 
the disagreement from Liang and Chen’s colleagues from the Beijing 
Urban Planning Commission, where Liang and Chen were working. 
Zhu Zhaoxue and Hua Lanhong submitted their report to the Minis-
try of Construction on April, 20, 1950 (Zhu Zhaoxue and Hua Lan-
hong, 1995). In this report, Zhu and Hua claimed that Beijing was 
one of the oldest capital cities during Chinese history with both tra-
ditional splendor and modern civic facilities, which bestowed Beijing 
the perfect condition to become the capital of the new state. Th ey in-
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sisted that new buildings would prevent the decline of the old city and 
bring prosperity to all residents, which exactly refl ected the socialistic 
development (Zhu Zhaoxue and Hua Lanhong, 1995). 
Zhu and Hua’s opinions still focused on the academic discus-
sion. However, a few weeks later, some colleagues and mid-level party 
leaders began to politicalize Liang and Chen’s proposal. Th ey claimed 
that Liang and Chen tried to stand up to the Soviet experts as an 
equal and disobeyed the central government’s policy of “supporting 
the Soviet Union and learning from the Soviet Union”. In addition, 
some people denounced Liang and Chen attempted to defy Tian An-
men as the national political center that all Chinese people yearned 
for (Zhao, 1990). Th e unlimited politicalization of academic discus-
sion proved to be a good tool to put down Liang and Chen’s struggle 
of preserving old city of Beijing. For example, Chen and Hua once 
had a dispute on whether preserve the old city walls when planning 
Beijing train station. Th e superior leader involved in and held a meet-
ing, in which the leader claimed that the attitude towards the city 
walls actually indicated the political attitude towards class preference 
(Chen, 1980). Th e city walls were considered the symbol of feudal ex-
ploitation. Chen’s design team members were so scared that he im-
mediately was separated (Wang, 2002). Liang Sicheng also helplessly 
wrote down that “Th e entire ideological world develops so fast that I 
always am behind. How can I do?” (Lin, 1996). 
Th e top communist leaders never indicated their opinions to Liang 
and Chen. But their attitude was so apparent. Th e rebuilding of Bei-
jing old city quietly started followed the Soviet proposal. From 1951 
to 1959, the entire outer city-walls had been dismantled, hundreds of 
gateway entrances (pailou) and gate towers had been removed, and 
thousands of old dwellings (hutong) had been demolished. 
Mao Zedong’s attitude in fact determined the outcome of the dis-
pute of whether preserving old city of Beijing or building the new ur-
ban center. As mentioned above, the Soviet planners knew that Mao 
liked to stay at the old city. Ma Jun, the secretary of Pengzhen, the 
mayor of Beijing, recalled that “When Chairman Mao read the pro-
posal submitted by the Soviet experts, he was very satisfi ed and wrote 
down the decision of ‘this is the guideline’.” (Wang, 2002). Liang Si-
cheng’s son also remembered that “one friend working with senior 
leaders said Chairman Mao became disgruntled when the Liang-
Chen proposal was submitted. He complained there was a professor 
who wanted to drive him out of Beijing. Mao once shouted angri-
ly ‘why emperors could live in Beijing, but I cannot?’” (Wang, 2002). 
In fact, Liang Sicheng might forget that Pengzhen had told him once 
that Chairman Mao wanted to see the city full of factory chimneys 
from Tian Anmen where he was standing (Lin, 1996). From Mao’s 
speech at the Great Leap movement in later 1950s, Mao clearly ex-
pressed his opinion regarding this issue. In January 1958, Mao said 
“I felt houses in Beijing and Kaifeng are so nasty”; and “antique can 
be good, and also can be bad. Someone cried when Beijing disman-
tled the city walls and gateway entrances, which indicated the politi-
cal attitude.” (Mao, 1958). In the same month, during the 14th State 
Council meeting, Mao said “It’s quite nice that Nanjing, Changsha 
and Jinan have removed all city-walls. It’d better to replace Beijing 
and Kaifeng’s old houses with new buildings.” (Mao, 1958)
4. Conclusion:
Th e 800 years of old city of Beijing was preserved from cannon in 
1949 by the communist’s attempt to persuade the KMT general Fu 
Zuoyi to surrender. However, the protectors in 1949 destroyed the 
whole old city of Beijing in the 1950s-1960s. To preserve old Bei-
jing, Liang Sicheng sacrifi ced his entire life. Th e confl ict of preserv-
ing Beijing old city in 1949- 1951 was just the beginning of a series 
of struggle and fi ght. Later, Liang Sicheng was broadly and public-
ly criticized in 1955 because the government thought his insistence 
of remaining traditional Chinese architectural features in new build-
ings waster a large number of money. In 1957, during the Hundred 
Flower movement, Chen was identifi ed a rightist and was forced to 
leave his post and move to a labor camp near Beijing. Due to Peng 
Zhen’s protection, criticism on Liang Sicheng was ceased in 1958. 
But the movement of dismantling old Beijing never ceased. By the 
mid-1960s, the inner city walls had been wholly removed. After 5 
years of tremendous oppression during Cultural Revolution Liang 
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was dead in a cold winter morning in 1971.  
Comparing with later fate, the 1949 confl ict did not bring fi erce 
political oppression to Liang and Chen. At the beginning of the 
People’s Repulic, the communist government still kept a rela-
tive open mind and friendly attitude to the liberalistic intellectu-
als. Just after the civil war, the primary duty for the communists 
was to develop economy. Th e ideological remolding campaign was 
not launched until 1955, when Communist China had enjoyed con-
siderable success with its economic approach. In addition, the gov-
ernment still depended upon using “old intellectuals” ( Jiu Zhi Shi 
Fengzi) to develop economy. On the other side, most Chinese intel-
lectuals seldom involved in political aff airs. Th ey were easily accept-
ed communists’ seeming but worthless political propaganda because 
of abhorring the corruption and dictatorship of the KMT govern-
ment. Th e friendly and demographic atmosphere in Chinese politi-
cal fi eld during the beginning of the 1950s made most intellectuals 
believed that the true democracy was coming. 
Th e current urban problems that Beijing is encountering are 
exact these Liang and Chen has predicted 55 years ago. Few fea-
tures of old Beijing have been left. Th ere are hundreds of high-rise 
buildings erected in Beijing, which have totally destroyed the tradi-
tional skylines of Beijing and also aff ected the visual eff ect of Bei-
jing central axis and the Forbidden City. When the 2008 Olympic 
Game is coming, traffi  c jams and urban environment pollution are 
the two primary problems the Beijing city government has to fi g-
ure out. Among all 400 traffi  c intersections in urban Beijing, 99 in-
tersections are extreme traffi  c jam locations (Wang, 2003). As a sin-
gle center for cultural, industrial, business, political and educational 
center, the urban Beijing has increased fi ve times since 1949 and the 
urban population has increased 4 times. Reducing the urban popu-
lation is a long-term duty for the Beijing city government. Howev-
er, without changing the city organization — the major civic servic-
es and business areas still located in the old city, urban population 
keeps increasing. Th e highly increased population directly brings in 
the environment disaster. Th e green land in 1959 was 350 square ki-
lometers, while it quickly reduced to 244 kilometers in 1992, nearly 
one third lost (Wang, 2003). People in Beijing possess 342 cube me-
ter water per capita, while the average for entire China is 2,517 cube 
meters (Wang, 2003). Today, Beijing city government is planning to 
build several new satellite towns outside of Beijing. Th e history has 
been back to the original point that Liang and Chen proposed 55 
years ago. In 1954, when trying to prevent Peng Zhen, the mayor of 
Beijing about from demolishing old city-walls, Liang said “if you re-
fuse to accept my suggestion, and then let’s wait 50 years, when his-
tory will prove that I am right ultimately.” (Lin, 1996). 
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